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* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. Since
I am a U.S. Army (JAG) reserve officer and judge, I should note that
this review is not intended to express any views as to the wisdom or
constitutionality of any provision of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army, or the Army
Court of Criminal Appeals.
1 This book was originally published in 2007. The author subsequently
added an important introduction and epilogue in 2008. I have
reviewed the revised edition.
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Book Review
BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE MOST POWERFUL MERCENARY ARMY. By
Jeremy Scahill. New York: Nation Books, 2007/2008. Pp. 452.
$26.95, Cloth (2007); $16.95, Paper (2008). FROM MERCENARIES TO
MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES.
Edited by Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt. Oxford, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. Xx, 287. Index. $150, £65, Cloth;
$55, £24.99, Paper
Gregory E. Maggs*
In his provocative book, Blackwater: The Rise of the Most
Powerful Mercenary Army,1 journalist Jeremy Scahill has several key
goals. He principally seeks to expose the conduct of Blackwater
Worldwide (formerly called Blackwater Security Consulting), a private
contractor that provides security services to the U.S. government in
Iraq and elsewhere. Scahill sees Blackwater, which has now secured
over $1 billion in diplomatic security contracts from the U.S.
government, as thoroughly lawless, and he argues that Blackwater’s
employees should face criminal charges for a variety of incidents.
Second, Scahill condemns the Departments of State and Justice and
the Bush administration more generally for their collective “refusal to
hold mercenary forces accountable for their crimes in Iraq” (p. 47).
Finally, Scahill presents several powerful arguments against the
United States’ heavy reliance on private contractors in carrying out its
foreign policies and its military operations.
From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private
Military Companies, edited by Simon Chesterman (of New York
University and Singapore National University) and Chia Lehnardt (a
doctoral student previously in charge of an NYU research project on
private military companies), is a collection of fourteen scholarly essays
on political, legal, and economic aspects of using private security
contractors. Unlike Blackwater, the essays do not focus on any
particular companies. But From Mercenaries to Market and
Blackwater overlap in their consideration of a number of issues, and
each identifies several of the same problems arising from employing
private armed forces.
While both books have much to say, they each are remarkably
silent on what I consider—especially in view of the facts recited in
Blackwater—one of the most serious problems with the United States’
heavy reliance on private military companies. Quite simply, these
contractors may have become our nation’s Achilles heel. Essential and
yet extremely vulnerable, contractors and the institution of
contracting present a perfect target for opponents of America’s foreign
policy. By successfully attacking prominent security contractors like
Blackwater Worldwide, whether through law or public opinion, an
opponent could paralyze American diplomatic and military initiatives.
Before discussing the main themes of Blackwater, one important,
initial point requires mention. Although Blackwater is a
well-researched book, it is not a scholarly work but a polemic, through
and through. And while the book is often entertaining, it is also
frequently annoying in tone and rhetoric. “Blackwater is a private
army,” Scahill tells us breathlessly, “and it is controlled by one person:
Erik Prince, a radical right-wing Christian mega-millionaire who has
served as a major bankroller not only of President Bush’s campaigns
but of the broader Christian-right agenda” (p. 55). These common,
over-the-top utterances regrettably make substantial portions of the
book unreadable.
But putting all that aside, Scahill offers some important insights.
Consider first his contention that Blackwater is lawless and that its
employees should face criminal charges. The most significant example
appears in the lengthy introduction to the 2008 version of the book.
It concerns a notorious incident that occurred in Nisour Square in
Baghdad on September 16, 2007.
There are differing accounts of what happened that day. Attorneys
for the Blackwater personnel involved insist that their clients did
2 See the press release issued by the attorneys for the former
Blackwater employees involved in the incident, at <http://
www.raven23.com/uploads/Press_Statement_12-8-08.pdf>. The
material in this paragraph is all drawn from that source.
nothing wrong.2 They say a Blackwater team was sent to assist a State
Department official after her own security detail was attacked with a
roadside bomb. In Nisour Square, the Blackwater team came under
fire by insurgents and fired back, “fighting for their lives.” In the
process, civilians were killed in the “crowded, dangerous and chaotic
environment.” But the attorneys insist that their clients are not
culpable: “These casualties are not the fault of our military and
security forces . . . , but rather the fault of the insurgents who use
women and children as shields, behind which they launch their
cowardly attacks.”
But Scahill reports something entirely different based on his
investigation. A Blackwater convoy entered the square, made an
abrupt U-turn, tried to drive the wrong way on a one-way street, came
to an abrupt halt, and began shooting at random into the crowd. The
Blackwater guards continued to fire even though a uniformed police
officer signaled them to stop. The fifteen-minute shooting spree killed
approximately seventeen Iraqis, wounded twenty others, and
destroyed fifteen vehicles. The victims included women and children.
Witnesses said that Blackwater had no grounds for shooting and that
those firing weapons ignored shouts by their own colleagues to cease
fire.
Who is correct? Surely, no one can tell just by reading the
conflicting accounts, one by defense attorneys and the other by a
polemicist. Fortunately, we have grand juries to look into allegations
of this kind of wrongdoing and to determine whether probable cause
exists for a criminal trial. But even skeptics should agree that Scahill
has performed a highly valuable function in pressing the matter,
articulating the issues, and uncovering at least one version of the facts.
And no one should deny that if federal government contractors are
unlawfully using force, justice requires an accounting.
This leads to Scahill’s second general theme: the State Department,
the Justice Department, and the Bush administration were unjustly
shielding Blackwater and ignoring its wrongdoing. At the time that
Scahill wrote the 2008 version of his book, Blackwater personnel faced
no criminal charges or civil liability for their actions at Nisour Square
3 The immunity agreement signed by the witnesses contained this
provision: “I further understand that neither my statements nor any
information or evidence gained by reason of my statements can be
used against me in a criminal proceeding, except that if I knowingly
and willfully provide false statements or information, I may be
criminally prosecuted for that action under 18 United States Code,
Section 1001.” Jonathan Karl & Kirit Radia, Exclusive: ABC News
Obtains Text of Blackwater Immunity Deal: State Department
Grants Immunity to Guards Investigated for Shooting Iraqi Civilians
(Oct. 30, 2007), at <http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Story?id=
3795318&page=1>.
4 See 18 U.S.C. §6002 (a witness granted use and derivative use
immunity may not refuse to testify, but “no testimony or other
information compelled . . . (or any information directly or indirectly
derived from such testimony or other information) maybe used
against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for
perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with
the order.”).
or elsewhere in Iraq. The only thing concrete that had happened was
that the State Department had bungled (or possibly intentionally
botched) part of the investigation of the September 2007 incident.
After the shooting became headline news, the State Department
sent investigators to Iraq to interview the Blackwater personnel
involved. The investigators promptly gave the principal suspects “use
and derivative use immunity” in exchange for their agreeing to answer
questions.3 A grant of this form of immunity guarantees that nothing
that a criminal suspect says can be used against him either directly or
indirectly.4 For example, a confession could not be used in court
against the suspect, and if facts revealed by the suspect lead to further
discoveries, those further discoveries also could not be used against
the suspect.
The grant of use immunity makes Scahill apoplectic.
Normally when a group of people alleged to have
gunned down seventeen civilians in a lawless shooting
spree are questioned, investigators will tell them
something along the lines of: “You have the right to
remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used
against you in a court of law.” (P. 28)
5 See, e.g., United States v. Papadakis, 802 F.2d 618, 619 (2d Cir.
1986); Sates v. Seltzer, 794 F.2d 1114, 1120-21 (6th Cir. 1986).
6 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
7 See UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-23.400 (requiring the
express written authorization of the attorney general before
prosecuting a witness who has been given use and derivative use
immunity and require prosecutors to “indicate the circumstances
justifying prosecution and the method by which the government will
be able to establish that the evidence it will use against the witness will
meet the government’s burden under Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441 (1972).
He believes that the “State Department was apparently corrupting
or stifling the investigation or hindering a successful prosecution of
Blackwater” (id.). Scahill is probably correct to be critical of the
use-immunity agreement, but he seems to have misunderstood the
precise problem. Grants of use and derivative use immunity are not
always bad for the prosecution and good for defendants. This type of
immunity sometimes can be a valuable tool for prosecuting multiple
collaborating defendants who otherwise refuse to talk. In theory, each
defendant can be given use immunity and then forced to make
damning statements against all of his accomplices or coconspirators.
The government thus can build a case against everyone. If a witness
refuses to talk or tells lies, he can be convicted of contempt or perjury.5
The Supreme Court has held that this form of immunity does not
violate the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination.6 Use and
derivative use immunity in this sense is an ingenious law-enforcement
tactic that can break a conspiracy of silence, especially when physical
evidence may be inadequate.
Consequently, giving Blackwater personnel use and derivative use
immunity would not necessarily be an unreasonable investigation
tactic, especially when the crime scene was not immediately sealed.
The real problem is that the State Department does not appear to have
taken all of the precautions necessary to insure that the government
would make no incriminating derivative use of statements obtained
from immunized speakers. The United States Attorneys’ Manual,
which guides Justice Department investigations, stresses the difficulty
of prosecuting someone who has been giving use immunity.7 But
apparently the State Department did not do all that it might have done
to protect potential criminal cases against the Blackwater personnel.
8 See United States v. Slough, No. Cr-08-360 (D.D.C. Dec. 4, 2008)
(indictment), at <http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/iraq
/blackwater-indictment1208ind.html>.
9 18 U.S.C. §3261(a)(1).
That seems more like an error by inexperienced and ill-advised
investigators than a corrupt conspiracy.
But whether Scahill is right or wrong about the State Department’s
motivations, time has overtaken his complaint that the Bush
administration was protecting Blackwater. On December 4, 2008,
federal prosecutors obtained an indictment against five former
Blackwater employees allegedly involved in the shooting. The
indictment charges them with voluntary manslaughter of fourteen
persons who were killed, attempt to commit manslaughter of twenty
persons who were wounded, and using and discharging a firearm
during a crime of violence.8 This indictment suggests that the Bush
administration did, in fact, take the charges very seriously.
Obtaining an indictment, of course, is easier than winning a
conviction. As the statement by their attorneys indicates, the
defendants already are arguing that they acted in self-defense or
defense of others. We can anticipate that they also will argue that the
prosecution has made improper derivative use of their immunized
statements. In addition, they may argue that they have not committed
any federal offenses because the charged misconduct occurred in Iraq,
outside of U.S. jurisdiction.
The indictment addresses the jurisdictional issue by citing the
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, which states, in relevant
part:
Whoever engages in conduct outside the United States
that would constitute an offense punishable by
imprisonment for more than 1 year if the conduct had
been engaged in within the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . while
employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside
the United States . . . shall be punished as provided for
that offense.9
A key issue will be whether the defendants were “employed by or
accompanying the Armed Forces.” In reality, we know that they were
10 18 U.S.C. §3267(1)(A)(iii)(II).
employed by Blackwater and that they were generally accompanying
State Department personnel, not members of the Armed Forces. But
a special definition in the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
may preclude this line of argument by the defense. That act says that
“employed by the Armed Forces outside the United States” means,
inter alia, “an employee of a contractor . . . of . . . any other Federal
agency, or any provisional authority, to the extent such employment
relates to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense
overseas.”10 An unresolved question is what the phrase “supporting the
mission of the Department of Defense overseas” means. The State
Department may well not see its task as being to support the
Department of Defense; rather, it may see things the other way
around.
A third theme in Scahill’s book is his general objection to the
extensive use of military contractors. By now, everyone knows that
America relies heavily on private companies in Iraq and Afghanistan.
But the extent of such reliance may still be surprising. According to
Scahill, in August of 2007, there were more private contractors than
U.S. soldiers working for the United States in Iraq (180,000 vs.
160,000). Of these contractors, Scahill says that “[t]ens of thousands”
are “armed operatives,” but “exactly how many [is] unknown, because
neither the administration nor the military could or would provide
those numbers” (p. 46).
Scahill points out a number of problems with relying heavily on
security contractors. Perhaps the most serious is that many of the
incentives are potentially at odds with the interests of (in this case) the
U.S. government or Iraq. Security contractors like Blackwater, for
example, do not necessarily have a strong reason to further the overall
mission of the United States. In Iraq, the United States’ overall goal is
to pacify the country. But contractors like Blackwater may view their
task more narrowly; they are paid to transport diplomats or other VIPs
from one place to another without injury. They do not necessarily care
if they anger Iraqis in the process. Scahill quotes an Army colonel who
laments: “If they push traffic off the roads or if they shoot up a car that
looks suspicious, they may be operating within their contract, but it is
to the detriment of the [overall U.S.] mission, which is to bring people
over to our side” (p. 23).
Another inherent problem is that outsiders have great difficulty
obtaining a good assessment of the performance of security
contractors. The people whom they protect certainly have no incentive
to say anything bad about them; their lives are on the line. Scahill
quotes U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker: after questions were raised
about Blackwater’s conduct at Nisour Square, Crocker said that
Blackwater’s employees guarded his back—and did it very well indeed.
Private security contractors also have a deleterious effect on the
morale of service members in the armed forces. Security contractors
generally make far more money. A person with the skills of a sergeant
may make $50,000 in the army but $400,000 working for Blackwater.
Scahill quotes Secretary of Defense Robert Gates as saying, “I worry
that sometimes the salaries they are able to pay . . . lures some of our
soldiers out of the service to go to work for them” (p. 24).
I agree with these observations. These are all problems that have
a far-ranging effect and that do not have simple solutions. But Scahill
may be missing a larger concern about military contractors, in general,
and about private security contractors, in particular. The problem is
that they have a very dangerous combination of attributes: at present,
they are both indispensable and vulnerable.
Security contractors have become necessary in dangerous places
where the government attempts to maintain a diplomatic presence. If
the United States is to have ambassadors and other State Department
officials in Iraq and Afghanistan, it must protect them as they travel
around the country. But the State Department does not have the
employees or even the capability for training employees who can
transport ambassadors or other diplomats across Baghdad or Kabul.
The military could take on this mission, but only at the cost of taking
the necessary assets from some other essential missions. Certainly,
this reassignment could not happen instantly. The military itself uses
contractors for a great deal of its own transportation needs.
But there is no guarantee that contractors will always be available.
Given that the contracting companies are private, they could at any
time refuse to continue to provide service. Putting a few of their
employees in prison or slapping them or the company with large civil
liability might encourage them to quit the business altogether.
In addition, as valuable as security contractors are, political
considerations might prompt our own government to send them
packing in a hurry. They are not like the armed forces, which are
widely seen as always necessary and which have a strong reputation
developed over the centuries. Misbehavior by a few miscreants in the
army usually does not reduce the public opinion of the army as a
whole. The army’s reputation is based on a long and proud history, in
which a great many Americans have taken part.
But Blackwater did not winter over at Valley Forge; it did not
endure the Wilderness Campaign; and it did not land on the beaches
at Normandy. Whereas no one thought of getting rid of the army after
the criminal incidents at Abu Ghraib, the public might have less
patience with a private security contractor like Blackwater. Enough
bad press might cause the public to demand that the federal
government fire Blackwater and other security contractors
immediately.
Scahill gives only scant attention to this point. He recognizes:
If the government started slapping mercenary firms
with indictments for war crimes or murder or human
rights violations—and not just in a token manner— the
risk for the companies would be tremendous. This, in
turn, would make wars like the one in Iraq far more
difficult and arguably impossible. (P. 47)
But Scahill appears to miss a key implication. He makes this
comment only to explain why President Bush fought so vigorously to
defend contractors. I would be more concerned with something far
more serious: how our enemies might come to realize that contractors
are an easy, high-value target. If they can turn the tide of opinion
against security contractors—causing the public to demand that the
U.S. fire them or punish them so much that they voluntarily ceased
working for the government—our enemies could quickly cripple U.S.
diplomatic missions and U.S. foreign policy. Public relations in the
United States is not the only venue of attack. The United States is
constantly negotiating status-of-forces agreements when it deploys
personnel to foreign countries. A key issue is always whether U.S.
forces or contractors will face criminal liability under local law. Many
persons in former nations oppose giving contractors immunity from
local law enforcement. For some, this refusal to provide immunity is
simply a matter of justice. They do not trust the United States to
prosecute, and they do not want Blackwater and others to escape
punishment. But is it too speculative to imagine that some have a
different goal? Putting pressure on U.S. contractors may be politically
easier than actually fighting U.S. forces, but it can have major
11 See Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq
and the Organization of Their Activities During Their Temporary
Presence in Iraq, Art. 12(2) (Nov. 23, 2008) (giving Iraq the “primary
right to exercise jurisdiction over United States contractors and United
S t a t e s c o n t r a c t o r e m p l o y e e s ” ) , a t <
http://www.mnf-iraq.com/images/CGs_Messages/security_
agreement.pdf>.
12 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 609 [hereinafter Additional
Protocol Additional I].
13 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (2006) (Stevens, J.).
But see United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 n.25 (2d Cir. 2003)
ramifications. Our enemies surely can see, and will exploit, this
opportunity. Indeed, in November 2008, the United States and Iraq
entered into a new status-of-forces agreement that, for the first time,
subjects contractors to Iraqi jurisdiction.11
A more scholarly book than Scahill’s Blackwater is the collection
of essays in From Mercenaries to Market. This work, which was
produced as a project of the Institute for International Law and Justice
at the New York University School of Law, contains fourteen essays
about private security companies. The essays are grouped in four
categories: concerns, challenges, norms, and markets. They do not
present a comprehensive treatment of the subject, but they do hit
upon a number of important topics. Still, like Blackwater, they also
appear to miss the point of how vulnerable the United States has
become by relying so heavily on contractors.
Among the most interesting essays is “Private Military Companies
Under International Humanitarian Law” by Louise Doswald-Beck of
the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. The author
addresses various questions, including whether private military
companies can be combatants who may use force, who can be targeted,
and who are entitled to prisoner-of-war status.
On the issue of POW status, Doswald-Beck is skeptical. She doubts
that the employees of security contractors can have POW status, even
under the very generous provisions of the Additional Protocol I.12 (The
United States has not ratified the Protocol, but parts of it may have the
status of customary international law.13)
(explaining that “it is highly unlikely that a purported principle of
customary international law in direct conflict with the recognized
practices and customs of the United States and/or other prominent
players in the community of States could be deemed to qualify as a
bona fide customary international law principle”). See William H. Taft,
The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28
YALE L.J. 319, 322 (2003).
14 See Protocol Additional I, supra note 12, Arts. 43, 44.
Additional Protocol I reduces the distinction in the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949 between members of regular military forces and
members of other groups who take up arms.14 In general, both kinds
of fighters can have POW status under the Protocol. But the Protocol
still imposes some limitations; one is that members of an armed group
can have POW status only if they “are under a command responsible
to [a state] for the conduct of its subordinates.”
Addressing this limitation, Doswald-Beck writes:
[An] issue is whether responsibility needs to include
criminal jurisdiction by a state over such groups. This is
not clear, although the negotiators of both these treaties
probably presupposed that this was so because typically
such groups would have consisted of persons of their
nationality fighting for their country. This is not
necessarily the case for [private military companies].
Not only may its members not be of the hiring state’s
nationality, but also the group itself could be
incorporated in another state, or in a part of the state
enjoying specific jurisdictional exemptions, precisely in
order to escape its jurisdiction . . . . (P. 121, footnote
omitted)
The author may have had the United States in mind when
discussing how private military companies are not necessarily subject
to the criminal law of any state. At the time of the essay’s publication,
the United States had not brought criminal charges against any
contractor in Iraq. But the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act
and the Uniform Code of Military Justice both, she argues, impose
criminal liability on contractors. In 2008, the United States used each
of these acts to bring charges against contractors. The Blackwater
personnel, as described above, face criminal charges in federal court.
And a contract interpreter for the Army pleaded guilty before an Army
15 See Civilian Contractor Convicted at a Court-Martial (Baghdad)
(June 23, 2008) (describing the guilty plea to wrongful appropriation
of a knife, obstruction of justice, and making a false official
statement), at <http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view& id =20671&Itemid=128>.
16 See U.S. Expects More Attacks in Iraq: Residents Hang Slain
Americans’ Bodies from Bridge (May 6, 2004), at <http://
www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/03/31/iraq.main/>.
17 See GREGORY E. MAGGS, TERRORISM AND THE LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 232-33 (2005).
court-martial to various offenses arising out of stolen knife.15 Whether
there are constitutional or other legal problems with the cases remains
to be seen.
Some readers may be engaged by Doswald-Beck’s legal analysis
of whether members of private military companies have the rights of
POWs. They may believe that it would affect U.S. decisions whether
and in what circumstances to use military contractors. Others might
view the whole issue as irrelevant. After all, neither Al Qaeda nor other
Iraqi insurgents who capture Blackwater employees are likely to afford
them humane treatment, let alone POW status, regardless of what the
Additional Protocol I or any other treaty may say. When Blackwater
employees were captured in Fallujah in May 2004, they were promptly
killed and burned, and their bodies were hung from a bridge over the
Euphrates.16
But it is both important and refreshing to see careful parsing of
international treaties on POW status. While the immediate object of
the analysis might be to raise questions about the protection of private
military companies (and their employees) under contract to the United
States, the analysis also has broader implications. Over the past half
decade, there has been substantial debate about whether the Third and
Fourth Geneva Conventions should be read broadly to confer certain
protections to captured members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban even if
these foes do not meet the express requirements for such protection.17
If the Conventions are now read strictly to exclude American
contractors, as Doswald-Beck advocates, surely the same approach
should be applied when determining everyone else’s status. I doubt
that our enemies are in favor of that.
